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Abstract. This paper integrates ambiguity into a contingent claim model for convertible debt. We 
study how convertible debt valuation is affected by the ambiguity biases of equity holders and debt 
holders and provide sensitivity analysis of the bond value to changes in attitude toward ambiguity, 
firm and bond parameters. Our results, which are summarized into six main predictions, are consistent 
with recent empirical evidence and offer a possible interpretation of some corporate finance puzzles. 
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 CONVERTIBLE DEBT: FINANCING DECISIONS AND VOLUNTARY 
CONVERSION UNDER AMBIGUITY 
 
Convertibles occupy an important place in the international financial market1. A convertible debt 
contract gives the bond holder the option to convert the bond into another security, usually the common 
stock of the issuing company. It has been argued at length that appropriately designed convertible debt 
can reduce classical risk-shifting agency problems (both asset-substitution and debt overhang) between 
equity holders and debt holders (see, f.e., Green, 1984; Brennan and Schwartz, 1987; Chakraborty and 
Yilmaz, 2011; Dorion, Francois, Grass and Jeanneret, 2014). Convertibles seem particularly well suited 
to control risk incentives, because of their relative insensitivity to the risk of the issuing firm value. In 
fact, convertible bonds align the objectives of firm and equity value maximization, being hybrid 
securities that, while retaining most of the characteristics of straight debt, add the upside potential of the 
underlying common stock, which is associated with the conversion or equity option. Thus, these claims 
impose a particular shape of the payoff function of equity, which alters the incentives of the equity 
holders to take risk. At the same time, asymmetric information between managers and investors may 
affect the relative mispricing of debt, equity and thus convertible debt. When the manager has private 
information, he/she has an incentive to issue a security that is overpriced in the market. Similarly to  the 
pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), if equity is undervalued, convertible debt is less 
undervalued and thus a less costly source of funds, although more costly than straight debt; if equity is 
overvalued, then convertible debt will be also overvalued, but remains less costly than straight debt 
(Brennan and Schwartz, 1987). Hence, convertible debt may emerge as an optimal security, depending 
on the different forms of asymmetric information and beliefs of the investors.  
In this paper we incorporate ambiguity (or, incalculable uncertainty2) and the investors’ attitude towards 
it. The introduction of ambiguity into corporate finance decisions is a rather new and unexplored field 
and allows for more realistic features and explanations of still unanswered puzzles, while dealing with 
financial decisions (Garlappi, Gianmarino and Lazrak, 2013; Agliardi, Agliardi and Spanjers, 2014). 
Issuers and investors may differ in their prior beliefs and have different reactions to market signals 
                                                 
1 The total size of the convertibles was on average US$500bn per year during 2008- 2012  with around 2500 issues. This was 
about 1.5 the size of the FTSE 250 Index and equated approximately the 2007-2011 US high yield bond market issuance 
(US$591bn). In 2014 the total size of convertibles of US$ 268bn from 2346 issuers has become only a small fraction of the 
US$9.6 trillion corporate bonds outstanding from almost 7000 issuers (BofA Merrill Lynch, 2014;  Fitch Ratings’ Report: 
CB Funds Dashboard 2014), but the available evidence shows a growing global convertible market also in developing 
countries  (issuance volumes in Asia jumped fivefold in 2014, largely driven by China, source: Thomson Reuters, 2015). 
2 For a definition of ambiguity see, for example,  Epstein and Schneider (2010). Loosely speaking, while risk relates to 
known uncertainty (that is, the probabilities are known or can be estimated with confidence), ambiguity refers to subjective 
uncertainty (where outcome probabilities are unknown, or there is uncertainty over the probability measure governing the 
outcomes).  
under ambiguity or partial ignorance, as emphasized by recent  contributions within a behavioural 
perspective (Shefrin, 2009), a “managerial personality” traits view (Hackbarth, 2008), or the 
organizational real option approach (Trigeorgis, 2014). Behavioural biases and personality flaws 
(optimism/pessimism and over/underconfidence), which may include the attitude towards ambiguity, 
may lead to distortions and deviations from the true asset values and lead to decision “mistakes” (see 
Driouchi, Trigeorgis and Gao, 2014). In this paper we study how convertible debt valuation is affected 
by the ambiguity biases of equity holders and debt holders and provide some implications, summarized 
in five Predictions, on the effects of changes in relevant parameters on debt valuation and the 
conversion decision. To our knowledge, this is the first study integrating ambiguity into a structural 
model for convertible bonds, to analyse what happens when decision-makers are rational in all aspects, 
except for how they perceive the firm’s future. The behavioural biases impact on firm’s financing 
decisions and on the prices of corporate securities. 
  
 1. The Model  
Let us suppose that the firm’s assets in place generate a random stream of EBIT, tV , which follows a 
Choquet–Brownian process. It is defined on the basis of a binomial lattice, where for each st at time t, 
such that 0 ≤ t ≤ T, st+1u and st+1d denote the possible successors at time t + 1 for an “up” and a “down” 
movement, respectively. If “up” and “down” movements have the same capacity, then υ(stu|st) = υ(std|st) 
= c, where c, 0 < c < 1, is a constant that represents the decision-maker (hereafter DM)’s ambiguity 
about the likelihood of the states to come. If the DM is ambiguity averse, the capacity is sub-linear, so 
that c < 1/2 (Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 2008). If the perceived ambiguity increases, the value 
of the parameter c moves further away from the anchor 1/2. Thus, the capacity becomes more convex 
(for an ambiguity averse DM) or more concave (for an ambiguity loving DM). The absence of an 
ambiguity bias is obtained as a special case for c = ½. The symmetric discrete process above can be 
shown to converge (see Kast, Lapied and Roubaud, 2014) to a continuous time generalized Wiener 
process with mean m = 2c – 1 and variance s2 = 4c(1-c).  Thus, the firm’s EBIT value is given by: 
dVt/Vt = (µ + mσ)dt + sσ dBt     (1) 
where  Bt is a Wiener process, µ + mσ denotes the expected growth rate of EBIT and sσ  is the volatility 
per unit of time, as perceived by a biased DM.  For fully ambiguity averse DMs we have   -1 < m < 0 
and 0 < s < 1, so µ + mσ < µ and 0 < sσ  < σ . Both drift and volatility are reduced in comparison to 
the case of absence of ambiguity biases. We assume that the firm has straight debt and convertible debt 
outstanding, both with infinite maturity, in addition to equity. By C we denote the instantaneous coupon 
paid to holders of straight debt and by K the instantaneous coupon paid to holders of convertible debt. If 
all convertible debt is converted into equity, convertible debt holders will get a fraction ψ
ψ
+1 of equity, 
where ψ denotes the ratio of the number of shares owned by convertible bondholders upon full 
conversion to the number of shares owned by the initial shareholders. For simplicity, we suppose that 
the conversion terms of the convertible security are constant over time. As Ingersoll (1977) explains, 
while dealing with convertible issues in aggregate, the terms of conversion can be expressed by a 
dilution factor, indicating the fraction of the common equity which would be held by the convertible 
issue’s owners if the entire issue were converted. Here the dilution factor for equity holders is measured 
by ψ+1
1 , which is incurred upon conversion. For simplicity, block conversion is assumed, that is, all 
convertible debt holders exercise their conversion option at the same time, as in Brennan and Schwartz 
(1977), Constantinides and Grundy (1984), and others. The firm uses net EBIT to make the coupon 
payments or to pay equity holders’ dividends. When EBIT net of coupon payments is not sufficient, the 
equity holders finance this gap, unless they decide to declare bankruptcy, in which case, a fraction Θ  
∈[0,1] of the value of assets is lost due to direct and indirect bankruptcy costs. Finally, in the basic 
model we do not add any call strategy, since we wish to separate the pure effects on  voluntary 
conversion from a call induced conversion. Some implications of corporate call policies in our setting 
will be discussed in Section 2. 
There are two optimization problems faced by equity holders and debt holders. The holders of 
convertible debt optimally choose the conversion threshold kV . Conversion is voluntary. The benefit of 
conversion is the possibility of taking advantage of the upside potential of equity and receiving the 
dividend stream that may be higher than convertible coupon, while the cost of conversion is to give up 
the option of conversion. The firm’s equity holders optimally select the default thresholds: let us denote 
by sdV  the post-conversion default threshold (that is, the default threshold with straight debt only, after 
conversion occurred), and by cdV  the pre-conversion default threshold (that is, the default threshold 
with both straight debt and convertible debt, before conversion occurred). We denote the value of equity 
by E(V),  the value of straight debt by D(V) and the value of convertible debt by B(V). The standard 
contingent claims argument  applied to biased equity holders, maximizing the perceived (subjective) 
value of equity, allows us to derive the value of equity before conversion by solving the following 
ODE: 
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positive and 2β  is negative. Similarly, we can find the values of straight debt D(V) and of convertible 
debt B(V) before conversion. For simplicity, let us suppose that debt holders have the same perceived 
ambiguity of equity holders. In Section 3 we examine also the case where the perceived ambiguity 
values of debt holders may differ from the equity holders’, which implies that the m and s parameters 
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Conditions (4) and (5) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions set by equity holders at 
default, such that equity equals zero at default, while condition (6) establishes that the value of equity at 
the optimal conversion threshold must equal the value of the newly issued equity, accrued by equity 
holders after conversion and taking into account equity dilution (i.e., given the fraction Ψ+1
1 ). 
Conditions (7) and (8) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions set by debt holders, 
ensuring that the value of a convertible bond equals the fraction of the value of equity obtained after 
conversion, given the fraction Ψ+
Ψ
1
. Finally, condition (9) shows that the convertible debt holders’ 
claim equals the firm’s abandonment value, net of bankruptcy costs, at default (see also Lyandres and 
Zhdanov, 2014). By computation on (4), (5), (7) and (8) we can obtain the following expressions: 
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By plugging the expressions of X, Y, G and F into (6) and (9) we obtain the values of kV  and cdV , 
which can be solved numerically. 
Let us examine the effects of variation in selected parameters on the relationship between the value of 
convertible debt  and EBIT. The base case parameters, characterizing a representative firm are as 
follows: r=0.04, µ =0.01, C=0.1, K=0.08, σ =0.2,Ψ =1.  
Figure 1 shows the value of convertible debt as ambiguity perceived by ambiguity averse claimholders 
changes (c=0.5; c=0.4; c=0.3). Convertible debt holders participate in the firm’s upside potential if 
asset values are high enough to make the conversion valuable.  Convertible debt financing affects the 
payoffs and thus equity valuation: old equity holders must share the payoffs with the new equity 
holders, as new equity is issued and existing equity is diluted. Figure 1 shows that the conversion 
threshold is always bigger than the default threshold and both thresholds increase as ambiguity 
perceived by ambiguity averse claimholders increases (that is, c decreases). Thus, convertibles issued 
by less ambiguity averse firms should have a lower conversion threshold. A comparison between the 
post-conversion threshold sdV  and the pre-conversion threshold cdV  shows that sdV < cdV , for all 
parameter values3, implying that convertibles improve the solvability of the firm, delaying default. This 
result seems to be consistent with empirical findings by Isagawa (2002) and Dutordoir, Strong and 
Ziegan (2014), showing that convertibles alleviate firms’ financial distress and are perceived as more 
valuable for firms with weaker corporate governance and higher distress costs. Prediction 1 summarizes 
these implications. 
 
Prediction 1. Conversion occurs at a higher conversion threshold if ambiguity perceived by ambiguity 
averse claimholders increases. Default is anticipated as perceived ambiguity increases, but the 
presence of convertibles alleviates firm’s distress. 
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                                       Figure 1: r=0.04, µ =0.01, C=0.1, K=0.08, σ =0.2,Ψ =1 
 
Numerical computations (not reported for brevity) show that Prediction 1 is preserved, if we change  the 
conversion terms, i.e., the fraction of the firm’s shares into which the bond is convertible, although the 
value of  convertible debt decreases as the conversion ratio decreases. One can show that the value of  
convertible debt decreases as volatility increases up to a value of EBIT, then it increases as volatility 
increases, that is, there is a single-crossing behavior. An increase in volatility both raises the expected 
loss through default, as for straight debt, and increases the expected gain from conversion. The former 
effect decreases the bond value, while the latter affects the conversion option, increasing the bond 
value. For low values of EBIT, the former effect prevails and therefore debt decreases as volatility 
increases. For large EBIT values the latter effect prevails, and the equity-like component, associated 
with conversion, becomes apparent. Convertible debt should be less sensitive to changes in volatility 
than straight debt, because the value of the convertible debt component decreases in volatility, while the 
                                                 
3 For example, for c=0.5 we get  092.0,046.0 == cdsd VV  ; for c=0.4 we get  13.0,07.0 == cdsd VV  ; for c=0.3 we 
get  15.0,082.0 == cdsd VV  
equity-like component increases. Notice that this effect is completely different from the effect of 
ambiguity. Prediction 2 summarizes this implication: 
 
Prediction 2. For low (high) values of EBIT, convertible debt value decreases (increases) as volatility 
increases. 
Figure 2 shows the changes in the conversion and default thresholds for two different levels of 
ambiguity aversion (c=0.5 and c=0.3), as the coupon rate K of the convertible debt changes. Both the 
conversion and the default thresholds increase with the coupon rate K. A higher coupon makes default 
more likely (i.e., the default threshold increases) and makes the conversion option less valuable, since 
debt holders are prior claimants over equity holders at default. As a result, the conversion threshold 
increases, that is, it must be higher to make the conversion worthy to the holders of a convertible bond. 
On the other hand, for a given coupon, both thresholds are lifted upwards in the presence of a higher 
degree of ambiguity aversion, as discussed in Prediction 1. 
 
Figure 2:   r=0.04, µ =0.01, C=0.1, σ =0.2,Ψ =1 
Figure 3 shows the ratio between the equity value and the price of the convertible bond for three 
different levels of  c. Here Ψ =1, which yields a common ratio equal to 2 beyond the conversion 
thresholds. For all other levels of V, before conversion, this ratio decreases as ambiguity perceived by 
ambiguity averse claimholders increases, implying that equity becomes more (relatively) undervalued. 
Thus, equity holders prefer issuing convertible debt instead of equity as perceived ambiguity increases, 
which is consistent with a sort of pecking order prediction of financing decisions under ambiguity: 
equity holders rely on internal capital and debt first, and use equity only as a last resort. Thus, we get 
the following: 
 
Prediction 3. If claimholders agree on the same level of perceived ambiguity, then an increase in 
ambiguity aversion leads to aversion to equity.  
 If there is disagreement over ambiguity, say between the decision-maker and the market,  such that, for 
example, the market’s valuation is not biased by ambiguity aversion (c=0.5), while the manager 
believes that EBIT is described by expression (1) with c < 0.5, and therefore believes that equity is more 
overvalued by the market than convertible debt (because E(V)/B(V) for c < 0.5 is less than for c=0.5, 
see Figure 3), then the manager may wish to issue equity, reversing the pecking order. Therefore, the 
theoretical predictions about the effects of ambiguity on capital structure are somewhat sensitive to the 
modeling framework and the divergence in ambiguity assessment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
 
                                                  
                                       Figure 3:  r=0.04, µ =0.01, C=0.1, K=0.08, σ =0.2,Ψ =1 
       2. Call provision 
There is a vast literature studying corporate call policies for convertible bonds (see, f.e.   Brennan and 
Schwartz, 1977; Ingersoll, 1977; Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2011; King and Mauer, 2014). Since the 
theoretical models by Ingersoll (1977) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977), the appropriate (optimal) 
policy -  i.e., the policy that minimizes the value of the conversion option and thus maximizes equity -  
is to call as soon as the value of the convertible bond reaches the call price, that is, when the conversion 
value of the bond equals the call price. This puts an upper boundary to the value of debt, which in our 
framework modifies expression (7) into the following: 
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where CP stands for the corresponding call price. Empirical studies, however, show that the actual call 
policies do not even approximate the optimal policy. Actually, “convertibles are not generally called 
until their premium over the call price is significantly larger” (Brennan and Schwartz, 1987), and the 
motive for this deferred conversion remains a puzzle (see King and Mauer, 2014, and references there). 
Although we are aware that the empirical literature has tried to explain such discrepancy by various 
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determinants (e.g., tax-based razionalization of corporate call policies, as in the “cash flow advantage” 
hypothesis, management concern about future selling of convertibles and observed stock price 
implications, growth and sequential financing motives, as in the “backdoor equity” hypothesis)4, here 
we propose an interpretation of this delay in terms of an ambiguity effect.  
Indeed, let us focus on expression (14). Since  kV  increases as perceived ambiguity increases, as from 
Prediction 1,  CP in expression (14) is unlikely to be binding, whenever ambiguity is high, and thus, the 
issuer of a convertible bond  is more prone to defer the call. The puzzle of a late call may be eventually 
attributed to a behaviour consistent with higher perceived ambiguity. We can summarize this 
implication as follows: 
 
Prediction 4. Firms with higher ambiguity aversion tend to delay calling to force conversion.  
This seems to be consistent with some empirical findings of a positive relation between call delay and 
excess cash balances due to a cautious attitude (see King and Mauer, 2014).  
 
3. Asymmetric perceived ambiguity  
Even though equity holders and debt holders agree that assets are correctly priced in the market, so that 
there is no mispricing, there might be divergence in their ambiguity assessment. Let us suppose that the 
perceived ambiguity values of debt holders may differ from the equity holders’, which implies that the 
m and s parameters may differ. In Table 1 we compare the default and the conversion thresholds in the 
symmetric case (that is, when equity holders and debt holders have the same perceived ambiguity) and 
in the asymmetric cases (that is, when equity holders are more ambiguity averse than debt holders, or in 
the reverse case). If equity holders are less ambiguity averse than debt holders, then  kV   increases more 
than when equity holders and debt holders have the same perceived ambiguity. On the other hand, if 
equity holders are more ambiguity averse than debt holders, then  kV   decreases more than when equity 
holders and debt holders have the same perceived ambiguity. We can summarize this implication as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
4 The “cash flow advantage hypothesis” states that conversion will (not) be called if the cash flow advantage of a 
convertible bond, measured by the difference between the dividend on the converted shares and the after tax coupon on the 
bond is negative (positive).  A number of empirical studies since Brennan and Schwartz (1977) found that firms that call 
their convertible bonds experience a negative stock price reaction. This finding fostered an interpretation of this negative 
announcement effect in terms of bad news signaling, so that giving up or delaying to force conversion is a signal of 
favourable inside information. Finally, the “backdoor equity” hypothesis argues that firms issue convertible bonds just as a 
substitute for equity, so that, in particular, a firm will force conversion to equity when it chooses to exercise its growth 
options. 
Prediction 5.  As perceived ambiguity increases, and debt holders are more (less) ambiguity averse 
than equity holders, conversion occurs at a higher (lower) EBIT threshold than in the case of symmetric 
ambiguity.  
                                    Table 1 
  cdV  kV  
Symmetric 
equity holders 
and debt holders 
c=0.5 
c=0.4 
c=0.3 
0.092
0.13 
0.15 
0.42
0.47
0.50
Asymmetric 
equity holders 
and debt holders 
Equity holder 
c=0.5 
c=0.5 
c=0.5 
Debt holder 
c=0.5 
c=0.4 
c=0.3 
 
0.092
0.092
0.092
 
0.42
0.52
0.62
Asymmetric 
equity holders 
and debt holders 
Equity holder 
c=0.5 
c=0.4 
c=0.3 
Debt holder 
c=0.5 
c=0.5 
c=0.5 
 
0.092
0.13 
0.15 
 
0.42
0.34
0.28
   
       4. Conclusion 
Convertible bonds are an important segment of the corporate bond market, with total outstanding above 
US$250 billion. Over the last decades a considerable amount of theoretical research and empirical 
studies focused on why firms issue convertibles, and, notwithstanding a variety of explanations, some 
puzzles remain, at least partially, unsolved. This paper is a first attempt at linking convertible debt 
valuation to behavioural biases and personality flaws of managers and investors.  We integrate 
ambiguity and attitude toward ambiguity into a contingent claim model for convertible debt. We study 
how convertible debt valuation is affected by the ambiguity biases of equity holders and debt holders 
and provide sensitivity analysis of the bond value to changes in attitude toward ambiguity, firm and 
bond parameters. Our results, which are summarized into five main predictions, are consistent with 
recent empirical evidence and offer a possible interpretation of some corporate finance puzzles. 
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